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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
JOLENE M. WILBER, : Case No. 980271-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Communications Fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (judgment) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
Wilber to pay restitution for damages where the damage to the 
victim1 s property was not a foreseeable result of Wilber1s 
actions? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court "will not disturb a 
trial court's order of restitution unless the 'trial court 
exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its 
discretion.'" State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 
1997) (quotation omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Jolene Wilber1s ("Wilber") challenge to the 
restitution order is preserved on the record ("R.") for appeal at 
69 [43-48] . 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), Utah's restitution 
statute, is determinative of the issue on appeal. It!s text is 
included in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On May 24, 1997, Jolene Wilber assisted her mother, Ms. 
Lieber ("Lieber")1, in negotiating the purchase of a used car 
from Tim Dahle Infinity ("Tim Dahle") for $21,995. R.69 [7-8,40] . 
The car had 74,035 miles on it at the time of the agreement. 
R.69 [16] . 
Lieber executed a contract with Tim Dahle for the car. 
R.69 [17] . She payed for the car with a check for the purchase 
price drafted on the account of Matt Wilber, Appellant!s husband. 
R.69 [40] . Because the check was not drawn on Lieber's account, 
Tim Dahle requested that Lieber sign a promissory note that would 
come due on May 31, 1997. R.69[40-42]. Lieber agreed and did 
so. R.69 [17] . Although Lieber was in possession of the car, Tim 
Dahle kept the title pending the check's clearance of Matt 
Wilber's account. R.69[18-19]. On May 30, 1997, Tim Dahle 
attempted to cash the check. R.69[42]. The check did not clear 
1
 Ms. Lieber's name is actually "Leeper." However, the 
court reporter transcribed the name as "Lieber." Wilber refer's to 
her mother by the name used in the record in order to avoid 
confusion. 
2 
the bank and Tim Dahle never received payment for the car. 
R.69 [31-32] . Tim Dahle continued to retain the title. R.69[18] . 
On June 2, 1997, Wilber sold the car to Low Book Sales ("Low 
Book") for $13,500. R.69[18]. The car had 35 additional miles 
on it. R.69[18]. Low Book knowingly bought the car without the 
title. R.69[19]. Low Book requested the title from Tim Dahle on 
June 10, but Tim Dahle refused to release it until Lieber paid 
for the car. R.69[19]. 
In August, 1997, lawyers for Wilber, Lieber, Tim Dahle and 
Low Book began to negotiate for the return of the car to Tim 
Dahle. R.69[19]. Tim Dahle proposed that Wilber give back the 
$13,500 to Low Book in exchange for the car. R.69[19-20]. In 
turn, she would return the car to Tim Dahle. Id. As a condition 
of this arrangement, Tim Dahle required that it be able to 
inspect the car before it took it back. R.69[20]. 
Low Book indicated that it would agree to the deal, but 
refused Tim Dahle access to the car throughout the summer of that 
year. R.69[21,25]. According to Don Brower ("Brower"), the 
manager for Tim Dahle and the company1s representative in these 
negotiations, Low Book indicated it would not cooperate because 
it had not received the money from Wilber and it feared that Tim 
Dahle might try to seize the car2. R.69[38] . On September 4, 
1997, Tim Dahle rescinded the initial deal because Low Book was 
not cooperating with regard to the inspection. R.69[36]. 
2
 A representative of Low Book did not testify at Wilber1s 
restitution hearing. 
3 
However, in the interests of a settlement, Brower subsequently 
told Low Book at some point that he would accept the car without 
inspection against the advice of Tim Dahle!s lawyer. R.69[20] . 
Negotiations between Tim Dahle and Low Book continued 
through September 26, 1997. R.69[25]. As late as October 1, 
1997, Wilber's attorney represented that she would return the 
money to Low Book and the car to Tim Dahle. R.69[26]. 
Although Low Book did not allow the car to be inspected, Low 
Book represented that it would be available for inspection once 
it received the money from Wilber throughout August of 1997. 
R.69[38]. In fact, Low Book was no longer in possession of the 
car, having sold it to another individual. R.69[22]. Low Book 
did not inform Tim Dahle of the sale until August. R.69[22-23]. 
Low Book still did not have the title and was aware that the 
contract dispute concerning the car was ongoing at the time it 
sold the car. R.69[23]. 
Tim Dahle ultimately retrieved the car on November 25, 1997 
when it agreed to pay Low Book $50003. R. 69 [8,25] . The car 
needed detailing, had some minor body damage, plus approximately 
6000 additional miles on it, all of which occurred after Low Book 
sold it. R.69 [14,34,50] . Tim Dahle estimated the recovery 
costs, depreciated value and repairs to be $90004. R.69[27]. 
3
 It is not clear from the record how Low Book came back into 
possession of the car. 
4
 The approximate breakdown of expenses incurred by Tim Dahle 
is as follows: $5000 to retrieve the car from Low Book; $3200 in 
depreciation due to excess mileage; $673 in repairs and $60 for 
detailing. R.69[9-10]. 
4 
Tim Dahle also explained that the added mileage was the most 
significant loss with regard to the vehicle. R.69[14,31]. As of 
the restitution hearing date, the car was on Tim Dahle1s lot for 
sale for approximately $18,000. R.69[29]. 
On February 12, 1998, Wilber entered a guilty plea to 
communications fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1)5. R.21-22,34. Wilber, of her own 
accord, paid $13,500 to the court, which was to be disbursed 
between Tim Dahle and Low Book as the court saw fit. R.20. At 
the restitution hearing, the State sought an additional $9000 in 
damages on behalf of Tim Dahle. R.69[42-43]. Wilber challenged 
additional restitution on the basis that the damage resulting in 
expenses to Tim Dahle, i.e. the additional mileage, body damage 
and necessary detail work, occurred as a result of Low Book's 
sale of the car to the other person. R.69[43-48]. 
The trial court acknowledged that Low Book's "actions seemed 
to have increased some of the damages here and that but for that 
particular conduct, the economic loss to Dahle would be less. . . 
5
 The provision of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1801, under which Wilber entered her guilty plea 
provides: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice is guilty of . . . (c) a third degree felony when the 
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to 
be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000." 
R.22 (plea affidavit). 
5 
Low Book resold the vehicle, and it was after that that . . . 
so much of the additional mileage was put on the car." R.69[50]. 
Accordingly, the judge "adjuste[d]" the restitution award and 
ordered Wilber to pay Tim Dahle $8100. R. 69 [51] . 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TN ORDERING WILBER TO 
PAY RESTITUTION WHERE THE VICTIM'S LOSSES WERE NOT A RESULT 
OF WILBER'S ACTIONS. 
Utah's restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, 
provides in pertinent part: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided 
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (a) (i) . "'Restitution1 means full, 
partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (d) . !IIVictim' means any person whom 
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(1)(e)(i). "'Pecuniary damages' means all special damages, 
but not general damages, which a person could recover against the 
defendant in a civil action." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c) . 
Tim Dahle is a "victim" in this matter for purposes of the 
restitution statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (e) (i) . 
The trial court, however, exceeded its authority in imposing 
restitution on Wilber because Wilber1s actions were not the 
proximate cause of Tim Dahle's damages and, therefore, she could 
6 
not be held civilly liable. See State v. McBrider 940 P.2d 539, 
542 (Utah App. 1997) (where defendant does not dispute that 
victim suffered pecuniary damage, "focus becomes whether [victim] 
'could recover against the defendant in a civil action1") 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c)) . 
In McBride. this Court adopted a "but for" analysis for 
reviewing the propriety of a restitution order under Utah's 
restitution statute, and more specifically, under the provision 
of the statute (determinative here) which defines pecuniary 
damages as those recoverable in a civil action. See 940 P.2d at 
544 (citation omitted); see also State v. Guerrero. 896 P.2d 14, 
14 (Or. App. 1995) (prerequisites for restitution include 
criminal act, pecuniary damages, and "causal relationship between 
the two")6. McBride's analysis mirrors and is informed by civil 
negligence theory, especially the principles of proximate and 
superseding or intervening causation, which are instructive in 
the instant case. In this regard, the McBride Court explained 
that "''a more recent negligent act may break the chain of 
causation and relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor. . 
. .''" if the succeeding act is not foreseeable. Id. at 544 
(quotation and citation omitted); see also Bansasine v. Bodellr 
927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah App. 1996) (same). 
Under this "but for" analysis, the McBride Court upheld a 
6
 Utah courts have historically looked to Oregon case law for 
guidance concerning restitution issues since Utah's restitution 
statute is patterned after that of Oregon. See, e.g.r McBrider 940 
P.2d at 543; State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Depaoli. 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992). 
7 
restitution award. Id. at 543-44. In that case, the defendant 
was joyriding in a car that did not belong to him. Id. at 540. 
He was stopped by police for equipment violations. Id. The car 
was then impounded for registration infractions. Id. An attempt 
was made to establish ownership of the car, but was unsuccessful 
since the police incorrectly transcribed the vehicle 
identification number ("VIN") when the car was delivered to the 
impound yard. Id. at 541. The car was consequently sold. Id. 
Meanwhile, defendant pled guilty to joyriding and the court 
ordered him to pay restitution for the balance owing on the 
vehicle to the owner who was subsequently discovered. Id. This 
Court affirmed the restitution order, reasoning that the 
impoundment resulting in the sale of the car would not have 
happened but for defendant's actions and that it was foreseeable 
that the police would erroneously transcribe the VIN. Id. 
Under the foregoing, the trial court exceeded its authority 
under section 76-3-201 in imposing restitution on Wilber because 
the compensable damages suffered by Tim Dahle were the 
unforeseeable result of Low Book's dealings in this matter. See 
McBrider 940 P.2d at 541 (noting that restitution order should be 
vacated on appeal if the "'trial court exceeds the authority 
prescribed by law'" in imposing the order) (quotation omitted). 
As noted above, Utah's restitution statute allows a court to 
impose restitution upon a defendant whose "criminal activity [] 
has resulted in pecuniary damages." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (emphasis added). At Wilber*s restitution hearing, 
8 
the court expressly acknowledged that it was Low Book's, not 
Wilber1s, actions that "resulted in" the additional mileage for 
which Tim Dahle was later compensated. In the "but for" language 
of McBrider the court stated: 
I do have some concerns about the conduct of Low Book . . . 
[T]heir actions seemed to have increased some of the damages 
here and that but for that particular conduct, the economic 
loss to Dahle would be less. . . . Low Book resold the 
vehicle, and it was after that that . . . so much of the 
additional mileage was put on the car.7 
R.69[50] (emphasis added). 
Where the court expressly found that Low Book's sale of the 
car "resulted in pecuniary damages" in the form of lost resale 
value to Tim Dahle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i), the trial 
court "exceed[ed] [its] authority prescribed by law" in imposing 
restitution for the added miles on Wilber; Wilber's activity did 
not "result in" the added.8 Id. at 541; see also 4447 Associates 
7
 The car only had 35 additional miles on it when Wilber sold 
it to Low Book. R.69[18] . After Tim Dahle retrieved the car from 
Low Book, however, there were 6000 additional miles on it. 
R.69 [34] . 
8
 Indeed, Wilber was making efforts to return the car to Tim 
Dahle at the time that Low Book sold the car and the subsequent 
damages occurred. Although a clear time line is not evident, it is 
apparent from the record that at some point Wilber agreed to return 
the $13,500 to Low Book and the car to Tim Dahle. R.69 [19] . As a 
condition of the deal, Tim Dahle wanted to inspect the car before 
accepting it back. R.69[20]. Low Book also agreed to the deal, 
but refused to allow inspection of the car, claiming that it had 
not received the money from Wilber. In fact, the Low Book sold the 
car and it was no longer in Low Book's possession. R.69[21-23]. 
The fact that Wilber was trying to return the car at the time that 
Low Book was selling it and causing the damages to it underscores 
the court's finding that it was Low Book's, not Wilber's, actions 
that "resulted in," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , the damage 
to the vehicle and that Wilber is therefore not appropriately held 
liable under the terms of the restitution statute. 
9 
v. First Sec, Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 475 (Utah App. 1995) 
(holding erroneous trial court's legal conclusion where it was 
"contrary to its own findings of fact").9 Accordingly, the 
restitution order should not be affirmed on appeal. See McBride. 
940 P.2d at 541. 
Even if the trial court had not made such an explicit 
finding as to the break in causation, the restitution award 
nonetheless amounts to an abuse of discretion since the facts of 
this case establish that the damage to the car not only resulted 
from Low Book's actions, but were not a foreseeable consequence 
of Wilber's involvement. Id. at 543-44 (affirming restitution 
order only where more recent negligent act supersedes that of 
defendant and is foreseeable). 
For example, as discussed above, the damages for which the 
State sought compensation on behalf of Tim Dahle were caused 
after Low Book sold the vehicle. These damages include the added 
9
 See, e.g.. State V, Bonnie, 898 P.2d 1356, 1357-58 (Or. 
App. 1995) (vacating restitution order where State failed to prove 
that defendant's receipt of stolen computer resulted in pecuniary 
damages to owner; fact that computer was most recently in 
defendant's possession when erasure of owner's valuable data was 
discovered did not support inference that defendant caused erasure 
given burglar's testimony that he, and not defendant, erased hard 
drive) (emphasis added); Guerrero. 896 P.2d at 15 (Or. App. 1995) 
(defendant convicted of leaving scene of accident not liable for 
restitution for medical and funeral expenses where there was no 
proof that fleeing scene resulted in pecuniary damages to motorist 
or his estate; mere fact that motorist survived for short time 
after accident did not permit inference that injuries would not 
have been fatal if he received prompt medical attention) (emphasis 
added). 
10 
mileage ($3200)10, compensation for body ($673) and detail ($60) 
damage caused by the person who bought the car from Low Book, and 
$5000 to recover the vehicle. R.69[9]. Moreover, Tim Dahle 
testified that the added mileage which resulted after Low Book 
sold the car was the single most significant depreciating factor. 
R.69 [14,31] . 
In addition, the evidence establishes that Low Book acted in 
bad faith with regard to this matter. For example, Low Book knew 
that there was an ongoing contractual dispute regarding the car 
and that Tim Dahle made it clear that it would not release the 
title unless and until Lieber made good on the check she 
presented for payment. R.69[22-23]. Moreover, Low Book was 
involved in negotiations with Wilber, Lieber and Tim Dahle for 
the return of the car to Tim Dahle. See suprar note 8. Yet, 
despite the negotiations for the return of the car and without 
any assurances from either Tim Dahle, Wilber or Lieber that the 
title would be released in a timely manner, Low Book sold the car 
to another person. R.69[23]. 
Moreover, Low Book failed to inform Tim Dahle that the car 
was sold, even though Tim Dahle sought repeatedly to inspect the 
car throughout the summer of that year. R.69[21-23]. Instead, 
Low Book misrepresented to Tim Dahle that the car was still in 
10
 Upon cross-examination, Tim Dahle explained that it 
readjusted this depreciation value from $3200 to $1450 just prior 
to the February 20, 1998 restitution hearing. R.69 [14]. As 
explained by Tim Dahle's representative, the amount of mileage a 
car has becomes less significant with regard to pricing the longer 
the car sits on a dealer's lot. R.69[31]. 
11 
its possession and claimed that the reason it refused to allow 
the car to be inspected was because it never received payment 
from Wilber. Id. It was not until August, 1997, that Low Book 
finally disclosed that the car was no longer in its possession. 
R.69 [22] . 
In addition, Low Book's bad faith dealings are underscored 
given that Low Book is a licensed dealership with a professional 
responsibility to act ethically. As a dealer, Low Book had a 
professional responsibility to refrain from selling the car to a 
non-dealer until it received the title or at least some assurance 
that the title would be forthcoming. Given Low Book's 
professional role in this matter, it was not foreseeable that the 
it would in bad faith sell the car to another person where the 
issue of title was still up in the air. 
Under the foregoing facts, the unforseeability of Low Book's 
intervening actions in this matter are distinguishable from the 
intervening actions of the officers in McBrider which this court 
held to be foreseeable in affirming the restitution award imposed 
against the defendant in that case. See 940 P.2d at 543-44. The 
officers at the impound yard in McBride, unlike Low Book, were 
acting in good faith pursuant to their professional 
responsibilities when they accidentally miscopied the VIN number 
on the victim's automobile, leading to its subsequent sale. Id. 
at 544. 
Low Book, by contrast, acted in contravention of its duty as 
a licensed dealer when it purposefully sold the car to another 
12 
while the title dispute was ongoing. R.69[23]. Moreover, Low 
Book lied to Tim Dahle about the car when Tim Dahle sought to 
inspect it, thereby prolonging the dispute and creating the 
situation leading up to the damage to the car. R.69[22,25]. If 
Low Book had been dealing honestly in this matter and in accord 
with its professional responsibility, the car would not have been 
sold and, consequently, the additional miles and body damage 
would have been avoided altogether. Hence, unlike the defendant 
in McBride. who "created the opportunity for the [VIN] 
transcription error," Wilber did not "create" the opportunity 
leading to the damage to the car so much as Low Book did by 
virtue of its intentional bad faith dealings in this matter. 940 
P.2d at 544. 
In sum, where Low Book sold the car notwithstanding the 
contractual dispute regarding the title and in contravention of 
its professional responsibility as a licensed dealership, and 
where the damages for which the State sought compensation were 
caused as a result of Low Book's sale of the car, such actions 
were not foreseeable to Wilber and represented a break in the 
causal relationship between herself and the damage to the 
vehicle, thereby relieving Wilber of liability. Id.
 r* seer e . g. r 
Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677 (affirming that other driver's firing 
of gun into defendant's car was not reasonably foreseeable result 
of defendant's rude and reckless driving, and thus defendant's 
driving was not proximate cause of passenger's injuries). 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 
13 
restitution. 
In addition to exceeding its authority under the restitution 
statute in contravention of its own finding and the evidence 
which establishes a break in the causal relationship between 
Wilber and the damages to Tim Dahle, the court similarly abused 
its discretion in imposing $8100 in restitution where the 
evidence regarding the actual monetary value of the damages, as 
well as information that Tim Dahle was back in possession of the 
car and that Wilber had already deposited $13,500 with the court, 
does not support the dollar amount of the restitution order. 
The State presented evidence at the restitution hearing that 
established the value of Tim Dahle's losses to be $3200 in 
depreciation for the 6000 additional miles, $673 for body work 
and $63 in detailing to repair damage to the body of the car that 
also occurred after Low Book sold the car, plus $5000 to buy the 
car back from Low Book. R.69[9-10]. In addition to this 
evidence, the court was informed that the car had only 35 
additional miles on it when it sold the car to Low Book, 
R.69[18], and that Tim Dahle had the car and that Wilber had 
turned over the $13,500 that she received from Low Book for the 
car to the court one month prior to the restitution hearing. 
R.20,34. Based on this information, the judge ordered Wilber to 
pay restitution but reduced the amount from the requested $9000 
to $8100, explaining "the difference between the approximate 
$9000 and $8100 awarded . . . represents the difference in what I 
think the efforts of Low Book were that actually impacted on the 
14 
increased loss." R.69[51-52]. 
In the first place, the restitution order is unwarranted in 
this case since Wilber satisfied any liability she had with 
regard to the car and Tim Dahle. As the record indicates, Wilber 
returned the $13,500 that she received from Low Book when she 
sold the car. R.69[28]. Moreover, when she sold the car to Low 
Book, it had only 35 additional miles on it, which means that the 
car was in essentially the same condition, and worth the same 
amount of money ($21,995), as when she originally bought it from 
Tim Dahle less than a month before11. R.69[8,18]. In addition, 
Tim Dahle was back in possession of the car at the time of the 
restitution hearing. R.69[28]. Accordingly, Wilber satisfied 
her liability in this instance; Tim Dahle had its car and Wilber 
relinquished the $13,500 she received for the car from Low Book. 
This is true even considering the added mileage, body damage, and 
recovery costs given that, as the court found, those costs 
occurred as a result of Low Book!s uncooperative participation in 
this matter. See supra. 
Furthermore, even assuming that additional restitution was 
appropriate here, the $8100 order is excessive and does not 
accurately reflect the costs to Tim Dahle that resulted from Low 
Book's actions. As noted above, the trial court reduced the 
original $9000 award requested by the State to $8100 on the basis 
that Low Book was responsible for at least the additional mileage 
11
 At most, Wilber may be liable for restitution for the 
additional 35 miles that she put on the car. 
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on the car. R.69[50]. This $900 discount, however, does not 
even approximate the actual monetary value of the added mileage 
($3200) or body ($673) and detail ($63) work required on account 
of Low Book's actions. R.69[9-10]. Moreover, the trial court's 
ruling is inconsistent insofar as it accounts for the added 
mileage, but not the body damage and recovery costs, which also 
occurred as a result of Low Book's bad faith, uncooperative 
behavior. Considering the total of these sums alone, any award, 
assuming one was appropriate, should have been discounted by at 
least $3936. 
Based on the foregoing, Wilber urges this court to vacate 
the restitution award and remand for a new hearing. The trial 
court exceeded its statutory authority to impose restitution 
where it expressly found that Low Book's actions, not Wilber's, 
resulted in the damage for which the State sought compensation on 
Tim Dahle's behalf. Moreover, Low Book's bad faith dealings in 
this matter were not a foreseeable consequence of Wilber's 
initial involvement. Finally, the dollar amount of the award 
does not accurately reflect the actual amount of the damages that 
were attributable to Low Book's actions, let alone the fact that 
Tim Dahle was already in possession of the car and the fact that 
Wilber had deposited $13,500 with the court in satisfaction of 
her liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Wilber respectfully requests this 
court to vacate the restitution order and remand for a new 
16 
restitution hearing. 
SUBMITTED this Sl^A. day of November, 1998. 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Ju nns&iiEHT L^LFVli. 
3rd DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE CF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
J0L2NZ M WILBZR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMXITMEN: 
Case No: S71020995 FS 
Judge: ANNE M. STIRBA 
Date: March 15, 1993 
PRESENT 
Prosecutor: REBECCA C HYDE 
ROBERT STOTT 
Defendant 
"2-2-"2- \ 2 ^ 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birrh: April 5, 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: 9:19 
Clerk: marcyt 
CHARGES 
2. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
Case No: 971020995 
Date: Mar 16, 1393 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Senter.ce is to run consecutive with sentence now serving. The 
Court recommends credit for time served. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
Defendant is to pay $8100 restitution as previously prdered. 
Dated this \ \0 --day of V^&JUCJK 19^fp. 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) M3 
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Utah Code § 76-3-201 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st 
and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 76-3-201. Sentences or combination of 
sentences allowed—Civil penalties-
Restitution—Hearing—Definitions 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or 
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including the accrual of interest from the 
time of sentencing, insured damages, and 
payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person whom the 
court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any 
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this 
chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public 
or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison 
without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of 
authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
*22162 (vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a 
sentence. 
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(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of 
criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning 
as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family 
member has the meaning as defined in Section 
77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c)and(4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes 
restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an 
order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket 
and provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment 
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek 
enforcement of the restitution order in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the Department of 
Corrections may, on behalf of the person in 
whose favor the restitution order is entered, 
enforce the restitution order as judgment 
creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order 
for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the 
order by civil process, the victim shall be 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes 
a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and 
shall have the same effect and is subject to the 
same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount 
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No 
ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall 
make rules permitting the restitution payments 
to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b)(i) If a defendant has been extradited to this 
state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to 
resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to 
which he has been returned, the court may, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, 
order that the defendant make restitution for 
costs expended by any governmental entity for 
the extradition. 
*22163 (ii) In determining whether restitution 
is appropriate, the court shall consider the 
criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution 
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the 
restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction 
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8). 
(d)(i) If the court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate under this 
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to 
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be 
entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
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paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the 
victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution 
constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment 
docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for 
money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on 
the amount ordered from the time of sentencing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make 
rules permitting the restitution payments to be 
credited to principal first and the remainder of 
payments credited to interest in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the 
court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from 
one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending 
criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to 
pay restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction 
or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is 
issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant 
to a court order. 
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*22164 (c)(i) Restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following 
schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is 
transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant 
is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is 
transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under 
Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of 
defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(6)(a) If a statute under which the defendant 
was convicted mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court 
shall order imposition of the term of middle 
severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either 
party may submit a statement identifying 
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is 
in writing, it shall be filed with the court and 
served on the opposing party at least four days 
prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are 
circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consider 
the record in the case, the probation officer's 
report, other reports, including reports received 
under Section 76-3-404, statements in 
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the 
prosecution or the defendant, and any further 
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the 
facts supporting and reasons for imposing the 
upper or lower term. 
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(e) The court in determining a just sentence 
shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding 
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime 
described as child kidnaping, rape of a child, 
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or 
sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes 
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the 
charge is set forth in the information or 
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the 
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest 
minimum term in state prison. This subsection 
takes precedence over any conflicting provision 
of law. 
(8)(a) For the purpose of determining 
restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the 
defendant to the sentencing court or to which 
the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element 
a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal 
activity, includes any person directly harmed by 
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of 
the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
*22165 (b) In determining the monetary sum 
and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, 
including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relating to 
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of 
healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the 
income lost by the victim as a result of the 
offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to 
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a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related 
services if the offense resulted in the death of a 
victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the 
court shall consider the factors listed in 
Subsection (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and 
the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with regard to the other obligations of 
the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant 
of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or 
may defer entering an order of restitution if the 
court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a 
result of considering an order of restitution 
under this subsection, substantially outweighs 
the need to provide restitution to the victim. 
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 13; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; 
Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 
337, § 1, eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, 
§ 1, eff April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 1, eff April 
29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff April 29, 1996; 
Laws 1996, c. 241, §§2, 3, eff April 29, 1996 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Section 6(2) of Laws 1995, c. 301 provides: 
"If H.B. 333 [c. 301] and H.B. 113 [c. 117] both pass in 
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